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abstract: The author posits the concept of language communities, as opposed 
to that of national language, as a more adecuate categorization in explaning the 
development of European language policies. Using the case of French, he argues 
that globalization and the current migration waves render the distinction centre / 
periphery, in terms of dominat vs. regional or subordinate languages, meaningless, 
since what have been traditionally considered national languages are being 
exposed to constant instances of creolization. Such a phenomenon, far from 
empoverishing these languages’ cultural idiosincracy, enriches them by enlarging 
their communicative effectiveness.
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regional languages, globalization.
resumen: Utilizando el caso del idioma francés, el presente artículo explora el 
concepto de comunidad lingüística, en contraste con el de lengua nacional, como 
una categorización más adecuada para explicar el desarrollo de las políticas 
lingüísticas europeas. En el contexto actual de la globalización y los movimientos 
migratorios intraeuropeos, las distinciones entre centro y periferia, en términos de 
lengua dominante y regional o subordinada, carecen de sentido, ya que lo que se 
han considerado tradicionalmente lenguas nacionales se ven sometidas a procesos 
constantes de mestizaje. Este fenómeno, en lugar de empobrecer la idiosincrasia 
cultural de las mismas, las enriquece debido a que amplía su efectividad 
comunicativa.
Palabras clave: Lengua nacional, mestizaje, comunidad lingüística, emigración, 
lenguas regionales, globalización.
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At a time when a supranationalist Europe is slowly being formed, and 
the continent is often encouraged to “speak with one voice” on the globalised 
arena, an equivalent, social Newtonian force is arising: that of regionalism and 
polycentrality. Intranational regional variations are marked across a range of 
issues. In the 2002 French Presidential elections, votes for Jean-Marie Le Pen 
were particularly high in the south and the northwest (Élection présidentielle, 
2002), and studies of obesity in the country show significant differences between 
the extreme north (highest) and Bretagne (lowest).1 In the case of language policy, 
however, supranationalist directives depend still on statist national language 
strategies, and these latter abstract from the historical patterning of language 
use across Europe in general. Such abstraction is evident both within nations 
(some of which date back little more than a century, and others which have 
pronounced regional identities), and in the light of the more recent emergence 
of separate nations (the Czech and Slovak republics). Ernest Renan observes in 
his seminal 1882 Sorbonne lecture Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, “la considération 
ethnographique n’a donc été pour rien dans la constitution des nations 
modernes”, but it is this ethnographic factor which is of primary significance 
in the “constitution”, here taken in its legal sense, of a supranationalist Europe. 
Given the background of increased regionalism within and across nation states 
in Europe, this present paper, as does the 1996 unesco Declaration on Linguistic 
Rights, “takes language communities and not states as its point of departure” 
and argues that the strengthening of the former across Europe is a current 
consequence and future hope not only of language policy but also, and more 
fundamentally, of current migration patterns, even if these are short-term and for 
non-traditional (i.e. not exclusively work-related) reasons.
Patterns of trade, war and persecution have long implanted settler groups 
across Europe, and these groups have retained their own cultural, spiritual and 
linguistic bonding after migration. In the late seventeenth century, the Walloon 
community in Thorney, Cambridgeshire, England resented French-speaking 
pastors from the French Church in London, but wanted their clergy who spoke 
their own language. Given the influx of trained, Huguenot/Calvinist drainage 
workers, and their importance in creating the contemporary fenlands of East 
Anglia, the combination of Walloon, Dutch, French and English in major towns 
of the area, not least the regional capital Norwich, made for a multi-lingual, 
1. The North and the Parisian Basin have the highest (some 14%), while the rest of France is around the 
10% mark. (Enquête ObEpi, 2003: 4). In their Géographie du surpoids, G. Salem, S. Rican, and M.L. 
Kurzinger found equivalent regional variations, and added that “Une géographie de plus en plus fine se 
révèle” significant local differences (as between the Moselle valley and Lorraine). Their research “milite 
donc en faveur de comportements régionaux, ce que de trop rares études sur les specificités dans le boire 
et le manger ont montré” (Salem et al., 2005: 2).
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multi-cultural, if ostensibly homogenous religious community in the area, a 
micro-region within Europe,2 long before more recent immigration from further 
afield (Trudgill, 2002: 97; Schreier, 2005: 109-10). This is a pattern, of course, 
which can be reproduced throughout Europe, and is constitutive of the making 
of its regions. Centralisation, such as the “Plan Magellan” in Belgium, or to a 
certain extent the notion of “belgitude”, will often confront an opposing social 
Newtonian force: the manifesto for Wallonie, for example. In his 1882 Sorbonne 
lecture, Renan notes:
Si la politique suivie de la maison capétienne est arrivée à grouper à peu près, sous 
le nom de France, les territoires de l’ancienne Gaule, ce n’est pas là un effet de la 
tendance qu’auraient eue ces pays à se rejoindre à leurs congénères. Le Dauphiné, 
la Bresse, la Provence, la Franche-Comté ne se souvenaient plus d’une origine 
commune. Toute conscience gauloise avait péri dès le IIe siècle de notre ère, et ce 
n’est que par une vue d’érudition que, de nos jours, on a retrouvé rétrospectivement 
l’individualité du caractère gaulois.
More than a century after his speech, the “vue d’érudition” has become populist, 
and has led to contention that that which Renan sees as a singularity is multiple 
(perhaps “des caractère[s] gaulois”). In the face of what Brigitte-Lange (1996: 
200, 245-46) describes as a now technocratic notion of “une langue analytique 
bien faite” - and which, one might add, extends to the pan-European institutional 
level also - there are compelling democratic reasons for the attendance to such 
multiplicity, especially when these take account of changing demographic 
patterns also. In terms of its cultural politics and search for identity, such a latter-
day view has nothing to do with linguistic “erudition”, but much more to do with 
the complexities through which aspects of a fractious “proto-European” history 
are levelled in the overriding interest to assert a working hypothesis for an 
otherwise equally fractious pan-Europeanism (Aiello and Thurlow, 2006: 158). 
While an updated Parsonian theory of general action informs much of the latter 
debate, the multiplicity of role-sets, occasional and provisional, formed through 
implicit negation, is often overlooked in the formulation of language policy. Such 
formulations are devised in defiance of a view, as advanced by Florian Coulmas 
(1997: 41), that there is “no stable, objective existence” to a language “outside 
the people who speak it”, so much so that “no categorical distinction between 
language and dialect or between mother tongue and foreign language can be 
justified”. In such statements, both by Renan and Coulmas, the inevitability is 
2.  The notion of “region” here then should extend for part of the city’s history at least to include notional 
(“imagined”) communities across the North Sea, and not to be confined as a near synonym of “provincial” 
in the British if not the Latin sense.
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embedded of that conceptual lacuna, so intrinsic to both historical and socio-
linguistics, between observer and informer, or between meta-description (even if 
based on empirical data) and actual language use, that which Coulmas, reapplying 
to it Renan’s famous phrase, calls “un plébiscite de tous les jours”.
Such a lacuna is evident in recent activism about linguistic regionalism 
and tradition in France. In October 2005, close to 10,000 people (Joan-Pèire, 
2005) demonstrated in Carcassonne for what he calls a “manifestation pour la 
[sic] langue d’oc”. David Grosclaude, the President of the Institut d’estudis 
occitans said that an aim was to gain a commitment to a “generalised opportunity 
to study Occitan”. Clearly demarcated against a hegemonic Francophonie, the 
name in which the activism prevails is still contentious, and itself subject to local 
and regional manifestations. “Le provençal”, claims the Insitut, “est la variété 
d’occitan parlée en Provence, le languedocien en Languedoc, le gascon en 
Gascogne, l’auvergnat en Auvergne, le limousin en Limousin”; “Lo provençau es 
un dialècte de l’occitan” (Institut d’etudis occitans, 2005). Yet such a statement 
merely pastes over, by strong assertion, that which, experientially, structurally 
and lexically, are widespread divergences, and which have been long-standing 
issues. The term “occitan” is here conceived, in an extension of that offered by 
Schlieben-Lange (1996: 63), in two quite separate dinomic relations: the relation 
of the historical langue d’oc to the langue d’oïl; and its own contested status with 
regard to other descendants of the former, some of which of course may share 
an inheritance with neighbouring languages, particularly towards the southwest. 
For this context, then, perhaps multinomia is a preferable term to dinomia, with 
its essentializing positioning of dominant and subordinate (Saville-Troike, 2003: 
46). Indeed, as René Nelli (1978: 31) has pointed out, “Le provençal est de 
l’occitan [here the former relation - oc to oïl - applies], mais l’occitan n’est pas le 
provençal [here the latter]”; only if “l’Occitane accèderait à l’autonomie interne” 
might arise a “sorte de langue commune”, this perhaps the dialect of Montpellier. 
Yet, given the subjectivity of this cultural mosaic, a Toulousien would not 
want to shake off the hegemony of Paris to fall under that of Montpellier. The 
Provençal groups did not wish to “créer une langue occitane qui serait le plus 
petit dénominateur commun de tous les locuteurs de Bordeaux à Briançon, mais 
bien d’œuvrer en faveur de tous les parlers issus de la langue des troubadours, 
qu’ils soient provençaux, auvergnats, gascons, limousins ou languedociens” (Une 
manifestation, 2005).
The roots of the demonstration at the regional-national interface force this 
vitality, complexity and variety into a conceptual gridlock of a unique, singular 
representation so that it can be reproduced on the national level; in turn, this seems 
a continuation of the oral/literal divide, still very much experientially valid post-
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Derrida, and which Schlieben-Lange (1996: 35)3 traces, in her section on Louis 
Maggiolo’s literacy research stretching back some two centuries from the Second 
Empire, as a central concern of the Revolution. If the higher order, other-directed 
regard (Occitan/French), is perhaps necessary, it is of course also a legacy of 
French regionalism since the 12th century at least, or the divisions of the state in 
the Second World War, but it risks making the object of its defence a static object 
of analysis, thus degrading both it and the spirit of the defence. “In the absence 
of the political community, contemporary or past”, claimed Max Weber (1978: 
393), “the external delineation of the group [is] usually indistinct”. Given that the 
precise delineations of the linguistic community involve a projection complicated 
by negotiations with history and present purpose, their outline and strategy are 
also subject to negotiation, both external and internal.
In his 1999 report to two French ministries, Bernard Cerquiglini outlined 
more than a dozen languages spoken in France, ranging from those derived from 
the Langues d’oc and d’oïl to those, non-Romance (or even non-IndoEuropean) 
associated with the extended periods of migration and mobility. 1999 figures 
provided by Philippe Blanchet, Louis-Jean Calvet, and others4 found that in 
Provence (that is, to be clear, the administrative region Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur, including the Département des Alpes-Maritimes), four languages were 
habitually spoken by around 100,000 people each (that is, just over 2% of the 
total population each). Of these - Italian, Spanish, Arabic and Provençal - the last 
named was spoken by the least number. Indeed, English was spoken by over 4%, 
close to 200,000 people. 
General figures for Occitan have chronicled its decline by about ten per 
cent a decade for much of the twentieth century, to a current one or two million, 
mostly older speakers. (Paden, 1998: 340-342). Yet Yves Rouquette’s (in Paden, 
1998: 342)5 prediction that “la seule chose [of Occitan] qui mourra pas, c’est [...] 
notre trace” is offset by the extension of the trace of other languages into Occitan: 
in 1996, a slim volume of Seamus Heaney’s poems appeared in Puèglaurenç 
(Puilaurens) with a rather cheeky foreword, asking why one would translate 
(“revirar”) his works into Occitan (apart of course because he had just been 
3. “On pourrait avancer la thèse que la Révolution Française est un moment historique de “ré-oralisation”, 
peut-être le dernier en Europe” (Schlieben-Lange, 1996: 35).
4. A report originally for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) and 
transmitted to the Institut national d’études démographiques (INED) and the Délégation générale à la 
langue française et aux langues de France and reproduced in Marges linguistiques no. 10 (Nov. 2005: 
65-87. In reproducing the article, the Marges editors say that although they use the term provençal for 
the “parler roman local en Provence” (65), they have reservations about its validity in the light of the 
information generated by the survey.
5. Two million (let’s be optimistic) is a small number, to be sure, relative to the size of France, but in some 
ways comparable to the population of the region at the time of the troubadors (albeit that France was the 
most populous country in Europe in the medieval period, much of this was in the north). 
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granted the “passaport” to translations in the world’s languages, the Nobel Prize): 
“Seriá un pauc cortet de responder “Perqué pas?” [...] l’occitan es pas encara 
una lenga mòrta, que sache!” (Coste-Rixe, 5). One might add that around 1750, 
Thomas Richards (1815: vii) made the claim that since the Welsh language had 
“continued for such a long series of Ages past”, there should be no doubt that “it 
is the Divine Will that it be preserved to the End of Time, as we have the Word of 
GOD most elegantly and faithfully translated into it”.6
Jacques Derrida (1998: 30) warns of a “new soteriology” which would, 
by saving a language, confine its speakers to a subaltern technological and 
economic position: “on this earth of humans, certain people must yield to the 
homo-hegemony of dominant languages. They must learn the language of the 
masters, of capital and machines; they must lose their idiom in order to survive or 
live better”. The masters become the saviours, who would enter the lost domain 
of an atrophying language and rescue the survivors (they “save some humans lost 
in their language”), taking them to the safety of a language with better long-term 
prospects. One might here, paradoxically perhaps, detect a voice, if muted and 
however ironic, of metropolitan France, or even of the cosmopolitan audience 
which is the context of and vehicle for postmodern critique. Such a view finds a 
haunting resonance in a 2000 paper by Jean-Pierre Puissochet who argued that 
for “une Communauté [European] unie et dynamique, capable d’interventions 
rapides et efficaces,” “un traitement égal de vingt langues” is “indubitablement 
impropre à porter”, especially so since “parmi ces langues, il y a, depuis 1973, 
l’anglais”. (Yet what would be the state of affairs if the uk and the Republic of 
Ireland had not joined, to which nations, of course, one could add Malta and 
Cyprus?).
That a language serves no other purpose than as a lingua franca, as a means 
of getting things done, has been written into the socio-political agenda of many 
kinds of states, and is a part of the imperialist rhetoric E. M. Forster parodies in A 
Passsage to India (1924) in the figure of Mrs Turton who had learned Urdu “only 
to speak to her servants”, therefore just “the imperative mood” (A Passsage to 
India: 62). Such is prevalent across a range of ideologies, and, in France, is 
traceable to the defence of the new republic in the 1790s, and particularly to 
the equation, itself very much in the enlightenment tradition, of connecting the 
regional with the barbaric and backward, and the peripheral (Breton, etc.) with 
the anti-revolutionary and seditious. This can be seen, throughout Revolutionary 
rhetoric, as an extension of what Mona Ozouf (1984: 32) calls its “fiction du 
6. The Welsh Bible appeared in its standard version in 1620, and was in use until the end of the last century, 
when a new translation appeared. For an ironic twist, one might note the claim made by James C. Scott 
(1999: 54) that “Illegibility [...] has been and remains a reliable resource for political autonomy”.
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même, au double sens du terme: l’illusion et la fabrication à la fois”. Bertrand 
Barère de Vieuzac, in his well-known 1794 report for the “comité de salut public” 
makes the connection unmistakable: “l’idiome appelé bas-breton, l’idiome 
basque, les langues allemande et italienne ont perpétué le règne du fanatisme et 
de la superstition, assuré la domination des prêtres, des nobles et des praticiens, 
empêché la révolution de pénétrer dans neuf départements importants, et peuvent 
favoriser les ennemis de la France”.
While however the French language was considered threatened within the 
nation, it had proceeded to develop elsewhere. Four months later and two months 
before Thermidor, in his Rapport [to the Convention nationale] sur la nécessité 
et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser la langue française, the 
Abbé Grégoire asked one of the most supremely rhetorical questions in the 
debate: “cet idiome [French], admis dans les transactions politiques, usité dans 
plusieurs villes d’Allemagne, d’Italie, des Pays-Bas, dans une partie du pays 
de Liège, du Luxembourg, de la Suisse, même dans le Canada et sur les bords 
du Mississippi, par quelle fatalité est-il encore ignoré d’une très-grande partie 
des Français?” There is, of course, an answer: those who were ignorant of such 
means of globalisation were (and in some cases are still considered to be) the 
very people to whom it had not been communicated, or who had chosen to 
remain insouciant of its benefits. French defines a nation, a state, and thus (and 
only arguably and demonstrably thus) a “language”; the others are “dialects” or 
“patois” (with the exception of German in the Bas-Rhin, “Italian” on Corsica, 
etc.) and are to be anéantis, annihilated. Whatever the laudable antecedents to 
the call in the Abbé’s clerical (even Jansenist) background (Bell, 2000: 123), and 
the relation to the policies of the report’s audience, the term is that of linguistic 
genocide.7 Some one-fifth (six million) people within France were “ignorant” 
of the national language, with the figure less than three million for those who 
could write it correctly. By a circulus vitiosus not taken, it is logically revealing 
that very minority base for the Revolution which was to become so crucial in 
the coming months, in that those who stand by the revolutionary zeal for literacy 
(by which of course is meant political awareness without critical interpretation), 
form around one-tenth of the population. 
Yet learning other “patois” was above all a needless economic impediment 
to a Convention which needed to be in a hurry to achieve its transient and 
increasingly unrealizable goals. In an argument hauntingly prescient of those 
of Puissochet, who argued that a “pression budgétaire”, especially “le coût de 
7. From the very title alone and in its clear pre-Thermidor zeal, Grégoire’s nécessité [...] d’anéantir les 
patois sits uneasily with Renan’s claim in his Nation lecture that it is “un fait honorable pour la France” 
that “elle n’a jamais cherché à obtenir l’unité de la langue par des mesures de coercition”.
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la traduction”, would act as “le frein linguistique” to integration, and of Lord 
Marlesford, in the present-day British House of Lords, which I will consider 
later, the Abbé remarks that it would “multiplie[r] les dépenses” and “ralentir” 
the assimilation to the new codes if one were to merely translate French into 
the “patois”: “ajoutons que la majeure partie des dialectes vulgaires résistent à 
la traduction ou n’en promettent que d’infidèles”. Some forty years later, in his 
polemical retort to the “comité d’arrondissement” of Cahors (Lot, Midi-Pyrénées) 
which had proclaimed against “patois” in its territory, Charles Nodier (1834-35) 
protested against both the view of local languages as barbaric (“infidèle”), and 
the “imperious” projection of the “unité du langage” in all parts of the country: 
“On parlera long-temps après vous le languedocien qui vous déplaît, le basque 
et le bas-breton [...] qui ont l’avantage de posséder des grammaires très bien 
formulées”. The “unité” would be “incompatible avec l’influence inappréciable 
des localités”. Here are meant the rural localities, perhaps, since national 
education and urban networks were gradually extending the acquaintance with 
French. A half century later, Gaston Paris proclaimed that learning (“la science”) 
had broken down the “imaginary wall” (Maggiolo’s line perhaps) dividing north 
and south, and had extended “une vaste tapisserie dont les couleurs variées se 
fondent” (Les parlers, 1888).8 The legacy of the regional language is an accent 
of French, an artwork which can be appreciated since it is static, finished, and 
removed from lived experience.
That vernaculars also evolve (Bailey and Ross, 1992: 530), are constructed 
“primarily in face-to-face interaction with peers” (Labov, 2001: 228), are 
conditioned by working and power relations (Habermas, 1971: 53), and across 
borders (not only contiguous ones, but, on occasion, across considerable 
distances) rather than subject to centralised authority within one country (Leith, 
1997: 157), are salutary reminders of the hardiness of the local in the face of 
such centripetalism (today accelerated and taken to a supranational). Indeed, 
the virulence of central opposition to the use of a particular language may in 
fact increase its oppositional power, as in the case of Breton historically, moves 
to reduce Occitan transmissions, or the Plan Magellan in Belgium. Since an 
amendment in 1992, French is written into the 1958 Constitution as the national 
(and in this case also official and juridical) language of the Republic of France, 
but - in a move which nods to the supranational European charter - since 2001 
the Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France at the 
Ministère de la culture et de la communication has recognized that “les langues 
de France sont notre bien commun, elles contribuent à la créativité de notre 
pays et à son rayonnement culturel” (Langues de France, 2006). In general, 
8.  The echo of Baudelaire’s “Correspondances” is perhaps accidental.
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and in consideration of post-revolutionary history, the decline of the French 
language internationally is an institutional psychosis, more a continuation of the 
concern for centralization and unity within borders than an abstract constituent of 
language policy alone. Such fears remain implicit in a state wavering for about 
a century between republic, empire and monarchy, and suffering from a surfeit 
of constitutions.
An elaboration on language policy is absent from the immediate post-
revolutionary rhetoric, with its accent on general liberties. The 1791 Constitution 
claims that “tout homme” has the liberty “de parler, d’écrire, d’imprimer et 
publier ses pensées, sans que les écrits puissent être soumis à aucune censure 
ni inspection avant leur publication”. Resistance to censorship according to 
language of articulation is here implicit, alongside that according to content. 
Some years later, with the beginnings of the siege mentality of the middle and 
late 1790s, the emphasis shifts to the indissoluble integrity of the nation at a time 
when this was under threat, and when certain areas - most of the periphery of the 
nation - might follow linguistic rather than political allegiance. While, from 1793 
for almost a century, language was not foregrounded in the various Constitutions, 
the view of the 1793 version, which in its laconicity at least might be a model 
for the 21st-century,9 that “La République française est une et indivisible” 
implies linguistic homogeneity also, making later precision redundant. Picking 
up on some of the most celebrated terms of the era, the post-Thermidorian 
1795 Constitution speaks of legislation as “la volonté générale, exprimée par la 
majorité ou des citoyens ou de leurs représentants”. Here, of course, we have the 
tension between a simple, a qualified (pre-established) and a rational majority, 
since the “general” is hardly the “majority” in mere arithmetical terms; later 
the term will be pleonastically and tautologically altered to “volonté nationale”. 
Such conflicts inform the assessment of that populism which, more myth 
than reality, underpinned the Revolution and which, gradually, let enter that 
rhetoric which was to permit a questioning of this unity.10 In the 1848 (Second 
Republic) Constitution, the adjective “démocratique” is added here, to become, 
in the 1946 (Fourth Republic) much more prolix version: “La France est une 
République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale”. The composition of the 
social and the linguistic contours of democratic interaction can easily be turned 
into unsettling concessions to the much cherished, yet much feared national 
9. The European Constitution draft (2004-??) in contrast, with its lengthy sections about office bearers 
and committee rights and duties, seems much more like an Imperial document (for example, the 1804 
Constitution). 
10. Generalising on this, François Furet (1983: 53) has opined that “l’idée de la Révolution” has served to 
“cimenter [l’]unité politique” around “[des] conflits”.
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diversities which in turn, in regard for language policy, are the targets of statist 
intervention and rectification.
The 1946 Constitution “garantit l’égal accès de l’enfant et de l’adulte à 
l’instruction, à la formation professionnelle et à la culture”. The 1958 (Fifth 
Republic) Constitution expands on this version, inserting after “République 
indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale” the assurances of equality under the 
law of “tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion” of 
respecting all “croyances”. Yet this was apparently too much, since “croyances” 
can only with difficulty be maintained independent of the language of their 
articulation, and again an act of limitation was thought necessary. The 1992 
Constitutional Law, pertaining mostly to France’s perceived role after Maastricht, 
inserts into the Second Article of the 1958 Constitution the contentious “La 
langue de la République est le français” before the flag, anthem, motto, and the 
principle - or rather the expression of a homage - of “gouvernement du peuple, 
par le peuple et pour le peuple”. So, again a sense of exfoliation - the law refers 
to the envisaged “franchissement des frontières extérieures des Etats members” - 
is offset by a defensive move, an isolationist, prophylactic measure which would 
project a vision of solidarity across the French borders.
As in constitutional law, so in educational policy. The 1951 “Loi Deixonne” 
(Loi # 51-46) established Chairs in regional languages at several universities 
(three for Occitan) and required that “les meilleurs moyens” be found to “favoriser 
l’étude des langues et dialectes locaux dans les régions où ils sont en usage”.11 
Again, an accommodation of language diversity is limited, in this case by the 
nebulous conceptualisation of the Sprachraum in the spatial reference to the 
local, defined historically rather than in the light of shifting demographics. The 
“best means” would include the use of “parlers locaux dans les écoles primaires 
et maternelles chaque fois qu’ils pourront en tirer profit pour leur enseignement”, 
and this, however, “notamment pour l’étude de la langue française”. In the 
Revolutionary period, such informants were to be used to expound Conventional 
wisdom through French, such that over more than a century and a half the local 
has been called to serve central planning, just as, on the twenty-first century 
supranational level, the European Committee for the Regions was asked to take a 
more active role in “explaining” the forlorn European Constitution project, itself 
of course a rhetorical exercise (a draft) which would claim to be more. 
The model is that of the language community as posited in the first article 
of the 1996 unesco Barcelona Declaration: “any human society established 
11. The French law (#2005-380) of April 23rd 2005 extended the scope of teaching of the “langues et cultures 
régionales” “tout au long de la scolarité” and yet specified the spatial limitation: “les collectivités 
territoriales où ces langues sont en usage”, 
 <http://www.education.gouv.fr/bo/2005/18/MENX0400282L.htm>.
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historically in a particular territorial space, whether this space be recognized 
or not [...] The term language specific to a territory refers to the language of 
the community historically established in such a space”. The “Loi Deixonne” 
therefore skirts the issue of what the unesco Declaration calls “a language 
group”: “any group of persons sharing the same language which is established in 
the territorial space of another language community but which does not possess 
historical antecedents equivalent to those of that community. Examples of such 
groups are immigrants, refugees, deported persons and members of diasporas”. 
Immigration here is implicitly considered permanent and non-rescindable; across 
Europe today, the pattern is complicated by short-term or seasonal migration, 
which needs more generally to be considered for the undeniable long-term and 
daily effect it has upon languages in contact.
In an expansion of both the “Loi Deixonne” and Article 2 of the French 
Constitution, the “Loi Toubon” (#94-665, 4th August 1994) on the use of French 
stipulates that it is “la langue de l’enseignement, du travail, des échanges et des 
services publics”, and that (Article 11) it must be used in education except when 
justified otherwise, including by “les nécessités de l’enseignement des langues et 
cultures régionales ou étrangères”. Economics however has an impact on policy. 
In a move which might limit Francophony where the lucrative business of higher 
education is concerned, there is implicit provision for courses in English, since 
“Les écoles étrangères ou spécialement ouvertes pour accueillir des élèves de 
nationalité étrangère, ainsi que les établissements dispensant un enseignement 
à caractère international, ne sont pas soumis à cette obligation” (Loi n° 94-665, 
1994). It seems a matter of negotiation how much of a university’s teaching need 
have an “international aspect” before it is free from the law. There is then concern 
with both the micro- and the macro-region, and French is uneasily located: 
defended against incursions in the former while welcoming the latter. Yet again 
the cosmopolitan masks an attempt to encourage the national, in the sense that 
“un enseignement à caractère international” is at least being conducted on French 
soil.
The concern about encroachment in its most contemporary form has not 
of course escaped the legislators. On the 10th November 2004, northern, ump 
senator Philippe Marini noted that the “Loi Toubon” favoured “l’intégration des 
populations à la République grâce à une langue commune” (Marini, 2004). He 
then proposed to the Senate that an addition be made to its article 2 which had 
specified that French was obligatory in documents dealing in whatever respect 
with offers of goods and services, including bills and receipts. In the form 
sent from the Senate to the Assemblée nationale in November 2005, Marini’s 
amendment would revise the line which states that all “publicité écrite, parlée 
ou audiovisuelle” by adding “audiovisuelle ou par voie électronique”. William 
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Labov’s (2001: 228) “conclusion” that language is not “systematically affected 
by the mass media” can find no favour here.
One can feel comforted, one can feel threatened by the assiduous care taken 
to legislate all aspects of language use in the mediafied twenty-first century 
context. The “Loi Toubon” is in spirit close to the statist view of language in 
which a citizen has the right to address an institution of the European Union, 
as envisaged for example in the postponed European constitution/Lisbon Treaty 
(articles III-128 and IV-448). The common principle - one language one nation 
- is however a simplification of states both larger and smaller, which are all a 
patchwork of regional identities, dialects and languages. In various situations, the 
principle of monolingualism, religious belief and culture is ingrained in a more 
popular imagination. For example, in exploring ethnic identity in the multi-ethnic 
community formed around a nuclear power plant in Lithuania, Kristina Šliavaitė 
(2002) came across an informant who - when she noted that some Russians were 
Catholics - responded with “if they are Catholic, how they can be Russians?” A 
“subjective choice”, she concluded, “of one’s ethnic and national belonging was 
also accepted widely”.
While language politics has varied over the past two centuries, two common 
traits are detectible for the present: first, the notion that a “langue régionale” is 
rustic, even pagan, fixed (and there isolated from the main, which is a bad thing 
for the globalisers). Second, their adherents are demoted as uncivilized, even 
savages, recidivist, dreamy, even dangerous; such tendencies are reinforced 
by attitudes towards events such as Le Pen’s relative strength in Provence and 
Alsace-Lorraine in the 2002 Presidential elections,12 other kinds of extreme 
nationalism in the South of France, torching holiday homes in Wales, and 
various kinds of separatist activities. Such recognition of subordination is given 
a positive spin by Lucien Febvre, from whom Fernand Braudel borrowed a 
phrase to open his L’identité de la France (1986): “que la France se nomme 
diversité”. Yet, as Henri Mendras (1988: 214) comments, such a claim is only 
the “contrepoint” of a more insidious focus on national unity, including “la 
centralisation capétienne”; such a counterweight, one might add, is dialectically 
inevitable and equivalent to such political centripetalism. Such diversity has 
temporal viability, Braudel claims, as long as “le village est la société la plus 
élémentaire [...] la plus ancienne, antérieure”. Expanding on this point, Mendras 
(1994: 230) has claimed that “Pour les Français la démocratie directe du village 
est la seule vraiment légitime”. That which is of abiding status, then, is the trace 
12. En passant, one might note that although not an exact correspondence, the relations between traditional 
marginality, abstention, and the vote for Le Pen can generally be asserted, as is shown in maps composed 
by the group of teachers of history and geography of the académie de Toulouse, <http://pedagogie.ac-
toulouse.fr/histgeo/citoyen/pres02/presid0.htm>.
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of the local, the dialect, and habitation over time in a place defined by tradition 
if not by individual experience.
Given the specific situatedness of everyday life, its ontological Heideggerean 
Geworfenheit (“thrown-ness”), a complex, provisional interrelation of “cultural 
resources” is continuously elicited, by which process “no resource is unequivocally 
destined to serve in a given situation; and every situation is in need of 
interpretation” (Friese and Wagner, 1999: 109). Immigrants become enmeshed 
in this givenness, through which the negotiation with the local becomes the 
common, yet greatly varied, experience of the new arrival. If an arrival comes 
to a locality with a large, established, similar community, the imposed task of 
learning the national language confronts this situatedness, and legislation will 
likely increase rather than decrease alienation, that is produce the very opposite 
of that which it is intended to create. With regard to the target language, the local 
may be mapped in several ways, or not at all, onto the national language, as it 
radiates out, and forms a subset modality. The term “local” is a relation, and has 
no independent conceptual status, yet it is the primary relation.
Between 2000 and 2005, the population of France grew by some 2%, among 
the highest in Europe, some eight times that of Germany and one and a third times 
that of the United Kingdom (if less than half that of the Republic of Ireland). 
While the influx into Ireland, many from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, is not 
likely to have much impact on the state of Irish (although it might, over time, 
influence Irish English), an equivalent influx into Provence may both increase 
the interest in Occitan and decrease that in French, especially if the former is 
accompanied by an upsurge in interest in the “Pays des Cathares” etc. Mendras’ 
chapter heading, “renouveau du local”, hints at a fundamental demographic 
principle that underlies the upsurge in interest in the dialect and “patois”. Two 
additional factors here to be identified are the movement to the periphery, even 
further away than the “dormitory town”, and the movements across Europe.
Transnational deurbanisation is perhaps a middle-class, even middle-
age phenomenon, and in some respects undermines the coherence of the local 
community (the “democracy of the village”). Yet such immigrants move to a 
particular location within a country, and thereby show an intrinsic interest in it; 
this would extend to the language they hear around them. In countries with marked 
regionalisms, this language is likely to be the regional language, and therefore 
cultivating this interest with evening language classes and such is one means 
of keeping up the language, even though it will change because of accentual 
differences, issues of code switching, mixed language interference, and so on. 
Yet such changes are inevitable for the national language also. For two or more 
centuries movements within national borders, the transportation infrastructure that 
made them possible and the movement towards national curricula which followed 
their growth, established the hegemony of the dominant region or capital in the 
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provinces. As Braudel (1986: 81) comments, “les mélanges de population jouent 
plus d’une fois en faveur de la pénétration du français”. In the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, however, such transnational migrations lead both to 
linguistic change at the “national language” level and to a possible widening of 
interest in the local language. While this migrant population offers then a useful 
corrective to simplistic statist models of language use and regional subordination, 
that connection which Braudel (1986: 83; my emphasis) draws, between language 
(through toponomy, etc.) and “notre passé” is disrupted by a divergent framework 
of belonging. Whether this divergence greater exceeds, or is akin to, that gradual 
loss of the past across generations cannot be easily assessed through generalist 
sociocultural parameters.
In the present style of globalisation (global mediafication), it is surprising 
how little it takes for the world’s attention to be shifted to a smaller state. 
Once considered endangered languages, and/or proscribed, the study of Welsh, 
Occitan and Lithuanian can be considered export-markets for universities in 
Lampeter, Montpellier and Vilnius respectively.13 Cost-benefit analysis needs 
here to be extended to personal, life-enhancing aspects, those which any 
university now increasingly projects in order to develop its attractiveness. The 
stagnation, uniformity and levelling of globalisation retreat in the face of such 
minute particulars as regional dialects of these languages, toponymics and 
spiritual practices which engage the self-selected newcomer. One is not talking 
of large student numbers, but, with falling birth rates, increased longevity and 
an increase in lifelong learning, and with the proper kinds of courses, such 
university programmes can and will flourish. One effect perhaps of the number 
of Lithuanians in the uk and the Republic of Ireland may well be increased 
interest in their language, particularly if - as is of course likely - a percentage 
marry and settle down there. 
It is often, and lightly said of many a global metropolis that many languages 
are there spoken. The national, or official language is fragmented, both in its 
general use and in the specific forms of utterance, and often governmental 
policies are designated to reinforce it. Yet what is irretrievably lost, and this is 
true for both a world language (English, Spanish, French) and an endangered one, 
is the specific historical grounding and sentiment, and this loss in turn can fuel 
rightist, anti-immigration opinions; in the 2007 French Presidential elections, 
some 10% voted for the Front National candidate. His 16,9% showing on the 
2002 poll (up from 14,4% in 1988) was described by the public opinion/market 
research ipsos site as “la réaction d’une France exaspérée” although they were 
13. Additionally, the tourist potential of language, culture and craft courses in such places as Porthmadog, 
Les Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer and Nida can be developed.
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not “tous des sympathisants d’extrême droite ou du Front national” (Le vote Le 
Pen, 2002). Since his high showing coincided with a high abstention rate (and 
indeed, this was higher than the percentage of votes for him)14 indifference to 
and disengagement from the centralised office were expressed both actively (by a 
vote for Le Pen) and passively (by abstention). Contributory causes are however 
the same: a dissatisfaction with political rhetoric, its disengagement from the 
lives of those particularly in the peripheries, whether (or mainly) geographical or 
linguistic. The register of political debate can be a significant factor in cynicism 
and non-action. Norman Fairclough (2002: 124-125) has deconstructed the uk 
New Labour’s promotion of “substantive dialogue” as merely apparent, and 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement (2005: 10) described the language of the European 
Constitution draft as “remarquablement obscure”. The debate over the European 
Constitution is as much a fight over the control of the idiom of politics as it is 
about either policy or temerity over the fulcrum of Europe shifting east.
In the wake of the Madrid and London bombings and French riots, intense 
debates about immigration, integration and multiculturalism are hallmarks 
of the incipient century. As in several German states, the Netherlands, and 
prospectively Australia, potential citizens are to be examined in their knowledge 
of and acquiescence to cultural norms and institutional proclivities. The tests 
are of course understandably controversial, and many natives would get the 
answers “wrong”. Yet the implication of such tests is that the new citizen show a 
knowledge of the national language, wherever, for example, in the language and 
dialect mosaic of Bavaria or New South Wales, the intended settlement. Here the 
national language serves as a hegemonic lingua franca or Sammelbegriff which 
mediates between the new arrival, competing ideologies (both internationally 
and within the nation’s own civil society), and actual, everyday language use.
The Dutch government’s film Naar Nederland is meant to screen out immigrants 
whose ideas might conflict with those – here almost transcendent or clichéd – of 
the Dutch; famous – from some European perspectives, outrageous – aspects of 
Dutch society are to be shown, as that the Dutch can “zich vrij uiten”, lie around 
on the beach practically naked, etc. Since some countries outlaw the depiction 
of such goings-on, however, the Dutch have kindly and appropriately censored 
the film (but not the questions?) for those countries. You can order the film in a 
number of languages (those just south and to the east of the Mediterranean, and 
with predominantly Muslim populations, dominate) but must answer in Dutch. 
For the language examination, speaking and hearing alone are required; you 
14. In the Presidential election of 1988, Le Pen garnered some 4,3 million votes (and was eliminated in the 
first round); abstentions were 18,65%. In 2002, he garnered 4,8 million votes, with 28% abstention, and 
was the second-placed candidate. 
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don’t need to read and write. This part of the examination lasts 15 minutes, and 
the only practical guidance for preparation given is that one can buy books and 
tapes, etc., and watch Dutch films - even if one wonders if these would be widely 
available. Even in Brasil, such films (and Dutch tv, also mentioned) are not very 
abundant, and in many of the source countries such grammars are likely to be 
costly. Would a phrasebook suffice? Given that many Europeans learn a language 
for their holiday, and claim this self-study as knowledge, should this not also 
satisfy the Dutch? The Abbé Grégoire includes in his survey questions about 
the prevalence in the given patois of indecent terms, of those likely to incite the 
corruption of morals or to excite to anger; all of which, implicitly, can be more 
easily policed in French. An opposing situation prevails with the Dutch, it would 
seem, since they expect the new speakers of the host language to accommodate 
their perhaps more sedate ways to the rambunctious, easy-going (from the Dutch 
perspective at least) lifestyle.
Increasingly then the economic value of a language impinges upon public 
discussion at the national and “supranational” levels. In the uk House of Lords, 
Conservative Lord Marlesford argued that local authorities should encourage 
immigrants to learn English, rather than have materials published in a variety of 
languages. His argument was utilitarian: he noted the “considerable resources” 
spent, and that English was “a priceless economic asset” (Hansard, 11 May 2006). 
A week later, in the same venue, Liberal Democrat Lord Dholakia opined that 
“citizenship means much more than learning English”; what was important was 
“the process of communication” in order to achieve “social inclusion, tolerance 
and a diverse society where human rights flourish” (Hansard, 19 May 2006). On 
the one hand, there is a rather undemonstrated view of language as an economic 
good;15 on the other, there is an equally opaque concern for “communication” 
as a “process”. Yet behind each, and as the generator of this economic process, 
is language education, which is conceived as the front-line of contact and social 
assimilation of the immigrant, the provider of a lingua franca as a sine qua non 
of social integration. And yet this significance should not be limited to fears about 
social cohesion alone: with much infrastructure (unlike other businesses) paid for 
by the taxpayer, mobility across Europe, and increased longevity, higher education 
can be seen as a high income generator. Even that much feared population decline 
should, demographically if not economically, mean that there are more housing 
units available relative to population size, thus a decline in property prices in 
relation to income, and thus an increase in disposable wealth.
Education, the reinforcer of the national language, can also be the vehicle 
for the wider transmission of the local, and the movement from centre to 
15.  This is clearly seen, perhaps, in the administration of teaching it, if not the activity of teaching itself.
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periphery, and internationally can serve as catalysts for increased interest in 
the supposed marginal. The “sensibilisation” courses in Occitan (often one 
hour a week) from which some 50,000 schoolchildren benefitted in 1999-2000 
(Sibille, 2003: 188)16 could easily be extended to include recent arrivals and 
those interested in the heritage and the patrimony of the region in which they 
have settled, especially since trans-European migration patterns are to a region, 
or even a small locality, rather than to a nation as such. With mobility across 
Europe becoming so widespread, with nations increasingly making a knowledge 
of the national language a necessity for employment and immigration, one might 
refine this process a little, the paradigm of which is that kind of “sensibilisation” 
provided by language requirement classes at North American universities, so that 
an immigrant to Naples will be versed in Napulitàno, to the Scottish Lowlands 
in Lallans/Scots, not to mention Catalan in Barcelona, etc. Yet not even Catalan 
was recognised in article IV-448 of the 2005 draft European Constitution. A 
language of mobility, of real contact across Europe, is not therefore in this sense 
an “official” language. The social Darwinian perspective on language change, 
evolution and change is fraught not only with linguistic problems but with those 
imported from the Darwinian model itself, no more so than in the view that 
a language in decline is suffering from the “law” of Darwinian survivalism. 
While however the inherited paradigm, formed before very recent migration 
patterns, would bear testimony to parts of this perspective, it cannot be retained 
after such patterns themselves have become the norm. They also of course have 
problems with a view of synchrony-diachrony that would see the written text as 
a repository of past forms which can become active under certain conditions, 
whether these forms be citational, structural or even “whole” languages (of 
which, mutatis mutandis, contemporary “Old” Irish, Welsh and Hebrew can 
serve as examples).
Outside Europe, cultural representation, language study and - in some cases 
- technical collaboration are organized through such quasi-independent, quasi-
governmental bodies as the Alliance française, the Instituto Cervantes and the 
British Council. Strategic and/or economic interests dominate the choice of 
location. In July 2006, the Instituto Cervantes opened in Beijing, and is housed 
in a building of some 3.000 square metres (Inaguración, 2006). The British 
Council shuts offices in Africa, and opens in Siberia and Astana, the new capital 
of Kazakhstan. In language learning, the ideological and - as in Lord Macauley’s 
1835 “Minute on Indian education” - the technological conjoin, even if, under 
certain circumstances, students may appear at a British Council class because 
they want to understand American movies better.
16.  Sibille mentions that in 1998 2.354 students were offered Occitan as a subject in the “bac”.
 134 cultura,	lenguaje	y	representación	/	culture, language and representation	˙	issn	1697-7750	·	vol	vii	\	2009,	pp. 117-139
There are clearly demarcated reasons why people learn a language, and these 
may be quickly categorized as follows:
• Pedagogical, curricular;
• Technocratic;
• Related to migration;
• Related to heritage;
• Touristic.
Of these, perhaps only the third would give an impetus (backed by family visits 
and intergenerational complicity) to an assured knowledge which could in most 
events become well-matched against “native speaker” competence. Here, of 
course, the terms are loaded: knowing a language and being a native speaker 
are often a matter of self-image. Given however that in no case can we learn a 
langue, we always learn a singular set of paroles (in the normal French sense) and 
series of mapping functions or norms in Eugenio Coseriu’s sense (of that which 
is habitual),17 which are as distinct from real language use as are the theorems of 
mathematical learning, since attitudinal choices are always in play whatever the 
relation of the “speech island” (here taken as the immediate context of the learning 
experience) to the notional, or often national context. Language is always and 
today increasingly cultural rather than hereditary. As definitions of all the above 
terms (langue, parole, norm, culture and heredity) are in constant, and infinitely 
variable and nuanced change, any language policy must be equally nuanced, 
especially when it takes into account the realities of face-to-face interaction 
across contemporary Europe. Will the declension and gender markers of German 
outlast the 21st-century, or will they be collapsed (as for the past century or so in 
Berliner German) with the increasing influx of those who hear “das” and oblique 
“der” as /də/? With its accent classes, case proliferation and clearly marked 
declensional varieties, Lithuanian is one language for which eu-related eventual 
settlement patterns could signal increasing radical morphological and certain 
lexemic changes.
Sprachraum debates, of course, are not new; neither are they unique to France. 
Historical linguistics, dialectology, creolization all confront language use which 
can only be examined in situ but which is subject to usual migration patterns 
and continuous change. At no time is this more the case than in contemporary, 
expanded Europe. In 1992 the Council of Europe devised the European Charter 
17. The norm is a “sistema de realizaciones obligadas”, not “lo que “puede decirse””, but “lo que ya “se ha 
dicho” y tradicionalmente “se dice” en la comunidad considerada” (Coseriu, 1958: 31). See also Coseriu 
(1952).
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for Regional or Minority Languages, which France has signed but not ratified. 
Article 12 of this charter envisages that parties will “encourager l’expression et 
les initiatives propres aux langues régionales ou minoritaires” on “le territoire sur 
lequel de telles langues sont pratiquées”. Certain terms here are nebulous, as in 
the French debate considered earlier: the source of the “initiatives”; the meaning 
of practicing a language; and the Sprachraum itself. Because the Council is 
distinct from the Union, strong support for the latter does not run against denial 
of the provisions of the former, and thus the smaller entity here can mitigate the 
centripetalism of the larger.18
That to lose one’s language is to lose one’s land is somewhat affective, 
even sentimental; but one could not change the word “country” here to “state” 
or “supranational actor”. The loss of minority languages affects us all because 
it reduces the range of responses to the lived environment, and although social 
Darwinism would be hard pressed to equate biodiversity with linguistic diversity 
except in the most generic terms, recent moves to relegate Pluto to less than 
planetary status have some resonance with debates about national language, 
regional language and dialects: it has been so often left to the experts to decide. 
National languages, some now global, are often koines or impacted, coalesced 
and almost undifferentiated creoles, communication through the lowest common 
denominator, or most embedded structural features. Similarly, a small state is 
likely, linguistically, to be outward-looking, even if (or especially if) it is the 
product of colonialism, in this respect at least, that it will learn a major language 
or adapt its own idiolect/dialect/language to fit the main. The mixture and 
gradual creolisation of the languages work against the dominance of the centre 
over the periphery or the simple groupings (American vs. British English; “Latin 
American” Spanish, etc.).19 In this latter respect, all Englishes are new, especially 
at a time when the second wave of recent immigrants to the uk (from continental, 
and especially after 2004 Eastern Europe) has added linguistic nuance, accent 
and a proclivity to those of the first wave, from the Commonwealth. While Braj 
Kachru and others might look for such new Englishes in the former colonies, it 
makes equal sense to look in Norwich or London itself, and for new Francophonies 
in Montpellier or Paris. We are all, and always - in the English sense of the word, 
if not so drastically in the Spanish inflection - losing our “idiom”, our way of 
speaking, and always, at every moment of every day, gaining another.
18. The European Constitution would envisage that the Union cooperate with the Council on cultural issues, 
one of which is surely language (Article III-280).
19. See, for example, Brigitte Schlieben-Lange (1977: 87).
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